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As a young subaltern, John Le Couteur, of the 104th Foot, left a lengthy record of his service 
in Canada between 1812 and 1817. In an entry 
dated 5 February 1813, when frequent inspections 
of the guard may have given him cause to reflect 
upon his men, Le Couteur wrote:
On one occasion at Fredericton, a private of the 
Light Company had offended deeply. He was 
condemned to receive three hundred lashes. He 
was paraded and placed on the Triangle close 
in Front of the Light Company. He was a stout 
fellow, on bon point. The lash lacerated his back 
speedily and the blood flowed freely. He stood 
close in front of me, the inward groan, at each 
lash, from being stifled, went sufficiently to my 
heart, but soon after, the Drummer, in swinging 
his Cat of Nine Tails, switched a quantity of blood 
over my Face and Belts. I fainted away like a Sick 
girl to my own great horror and Confusion, but it 
was not unnatural after all. The Officers laughed 
at me but the men did not.1
 In the British Army of the early nineteenth 
century, discipline had two meanings. The 
first was that it “signifies the instruction and 
government of soldiers.” “Bravery,” wrote 
Charles James in 1802, “will perchance gain 
a battle; but everyone knows that by discipline 
alone the long disputed prize of a war can be 
ultimately obtained.” Military discipline was “the 
authoritative declared laws for the guidance of 
all military men, and all military matters,” and 
“the obedience to, and exercise of those laws.” 
It was the “soul of all armies; and unless it is 
established amongst them with great resolution, 
soldiers become a contemptible rabble, and are 
more dangerous to this very state that maintains 
them.”2
 This article will examine the military discipline 
of the British Army in British North America 
during the War of 1812. This is but a summary 
of preliminary findings, as the records of the 100 
plus British, foreign, allied and Canadian units3 
that served in Canada between 1812 and 1815 
have not all been examined, nor have American 
records been studied to the same detail. It seeks 
to determine the application of disciplinary 
measures within the overall context of the 
British Army, and relative to the only other large 
field force deployed by the British, Wellington’s 
Allied Army in the Iberian Peninsula. Was it 
indeed discipline that soldiers were subjected 
to, or merely terror? Are our perceptions of the 
stern discipline faced by officers and men mere 
stereotype? Were the Irish “wild,” foreigners 
difficult, and the Canadians, particularly the 
Catholic ones, unruly? Were officers cruel? This 
study will also compare British discipline relative 
to that of their enemy, the United States Army. 
What is apparent from even this cursory glance is 
that courts martial were a matter of routine and 
the punishments awarded were the result of many 
factors and not normally just harsh attitudes.
 Military discipline was maintained through 
the laws and practices established by royal 
and parliamentary authorities. The Rules and 
Articles for the Better Government of all His 
Majesty’s Forces, better known as the Articles 
of War formed the basis of military law and were 
first promulgated in 1663. These are distinct 
from the Articles of War used by the Royal Navy, 
which appeared in 1661. The Rules and Articles 
provided general instructions on the procedures 
should an officer or soldier be arrested or placed 
in custody. The mechanism for dealing with them 
was the court martial.4 
 As a royal decree, the Articles of War and 
the sentences issued by courts martial were not 
enforceable without the authority of Parliament. 
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This came with the passage of the Mutiny Act 
in 1689, which established military law in war 
and peace, allowing the punishments under the 
Articles of War to be enforced and introducing 
the taking of life or limb where warranted. The 
Mutiny Act was renewed annually, making it 
the most scrutinized of all laws in the realm. 
Nevertheless, the prerogative power of the 
Crown continued until 1803, when a revised 
form of the Mutiny Act made the Articles of War 
statutory, once and for all asserting the authority 
of Parliament over the army.5 
 The Articles of War were applicable in Great 
Britain and Ireland, the dominions beyond 
the seas and foreign places dependent upon 
Britain. They were applicable to every officer, 
non-commissioned officer, soldier, volunteer, 
and, in some cases, civilian attached to an army. 
They were read once in every two months – often 
monthly – to the officers and men, along with 
“whatever parts of the present or future general 
orders are meant to regulate the conduct of 
officers and men.” If an officer, NCO or soldier 
was caught red-handed in the act of a crime, the 
Provost could issue and carry out an immediate 
sentence, otherwise a matter of evidence went 
to court martial. Hence the term, “bloody 
Provost.”6
 A court martial is a body convened to try an 
offence against military discipline, or against 
the ordinary law, committed by a person in one 
of the armed services. There were three types, 
each with different composition and scales of 
punishment. 
 A regimental court martial was composed of 
three to five officers, preferably an odd number, 
headed by a captain with lieutenants as the 
other members. It had no authority to try capital 
offenses or officers. Sentences were confirmed by 
the commanding officer. 
 The garrison court martial had similar 
composition and authority, but its members came 
from various regiments. The governor or garrison 
commander approved its decisions.
 Lastly, the general court martial was composed 
of not less than 13 members. It was headed by 
a judge advocate and could impose capital 
punishment or try an officer. Judgements of 
death had to have the concurrence of nine of the 
13 members of the court, or a two-thirds majority 
when more members were present.7
 By 1812, the provisions surrounding courts 
martial were elaborate – administration of an 
oath, proper drafting of charges, examination 
of witnesses, use of written evidence and 
adjournment to allow the prisoner to prepare his 
defence or gain counsel. These procedures were 
sufficient to make any parliamentarian happy but 
did little to help an illiterate soldier who found 
himself subject more often to custom than law.
 Newly-arrived officers in a battalion were 
trained in these procedures by attending all unit 
courts martial for at least three months before 
they could be permitted to be members of such 
courts.8
 Charges could involve many things: desertion, 
insubordination, infractions contrary to standing 
orders, embezzlement, drunkenness, sexual 
An 1805 treatise on courts martial which aided ofﬁcers 
with matters of military discipline. Many books such as 
these were privately published, making up for the lack of 
ofﬁcial manuals. 
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crimes and many more.9 The level of court 
martial and the punishment issued generally fit 
the crime. Le Couteur believed the punishments 
throughout the army were “tremendous in the 
extreme,”10 but much depended on the quality 
and attitude of the officers making up the board, 
the intent of the accused and most important, 
whether the crime involved violence.
 In cases where the death penalty was not 
applicable, punishments for the rank and file 
could include imprisonment, condemnation to 
serve overseas for a fixed period or for life, extra 
drill and duty or labour, fines or as so often 
was the case, flogging. Punishments for minor 
infractions included carrying weights, “riding 
the horse,” restriction of privileges or various 
forms of public embarrassment, which appears 
to have been greater motivation to act properly 
than corporal punishment.11 
 If a soldier was flogged, the maximum penalty 
was 1,200 lashes, a sentence issued nine times 
over six years in the Iberian Peninsula. Another 
50 soldiers received 1,000 lashes. From 1811 
onwards, two other methods of dealing with 
serious crimes were added. The first was for 
soldiers who deserted but did not go over to the 
enemy. Their punishment was service in a colonial 
corps, such as in Africa or New South Wales. 
The second, reserved for repeat offenders or for 
theft without violence, involved penal servitude. 
If violence was involved, then the offender came 
nearer to the gallows or 1,000 lashes.12
 Officers could be cashiered, receive 
suspension of pay or rank or lose their rank 
– in the age of purchase, this meant a valuable 
commission could not be sold. A captaincy in a 
regular regiment of infantry came at a price of 
£1,500, while a majority in the foot guards cost 
£6,300. Other punishments included reprimand, 
or discharge from the service with ignominy. 
Some 30 combatant officers were cashiered 
in Iberia for cowardice, swindling merchants, 
embezzling public funds, insulting or disobeying 
a commanding officer, drink, brawling, tyranny 
and immorality, just to name a few. An equal 
number of persons from the civil department 
– commissaries, purveyors, surgeons, hospital 
mates, etc – were also cashiered.13
 There was no permanent police in the 
army and only during war would a provost 
marshal, an officer of field rank, be charged to 
“secure deserters, and all other criminals.” The 
provost marshal, or his subordinates, were to 
“go round the army, hinder the soldiers from 
pillaging, indict offenders, execute the sentence 
pronounced, and regulate the weights and 
measures used by the army in the field.” In the 
Iberian Peninsula, a provost marshal served at 
Wellington’s headquarters, and each of the British 
divisions had an assistant-provost marshal and 
Flogging (below right) was a common punishment normally administered before the offender’s regiment or garrison 
and delivered by the regimental drummers. Labour (below left) was another punishment given for less serious 
transgressions.
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later a detachment of the Cavalry Staff Corps. 
The latter was a temporary, ad hoc unit created 
in April 1813 with four 132-man troops in Spain 
and two more in Britain.14
 While maintenance of discipline in Spain was 
challenging, it was even more difficult in North 
America, where the vastness of the territory 
resulted in many small, isolated detachments 
among which communication was extremely 
difficult. British North America comprised the 
two Canadas, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
the Islands of Prince Edward and Cape Breton, 
Newfoundland and the Bermudas. The forces 
assigned to the Captain-General and Governor in 
Chief, Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, also 
grew considerably during the course of the war. 
With fewer than 10,000 troops in 1812, Prevost 
had by December 1814 almost 50,000 men, not 
counting Canadian regulars or militia.15
 Prevost had four officers serve as deputy-
judge advocate on his staff at various times 
during the war, while there was an acting provost 
marshal and a provost of prison for the militia in 
Upper Canada. In Lower Canada, several junior 
officers served as deputy-judge advocate on the 
staff. There was no equivalent to the Cavalry Staff 
Corps or Provost in the field, although embodied 
cavalry may have been assigned this role on 
occasion.16
 The paucity of officers in some localities 
created problems in enforcing discipline. In 
1812, General Brock reported having too few 
regular officers to sit on courts martial and 
sought permission for Canadian militia officers 
to sit for personnel of line units. He also inquired 
whether he had the properly constituted authority 
to approve court martial proceedings of the 
militia, which was particularly important as 
Brock found the militia to be “unruly.”17
 Although complete statistics have not been 
compiled, a brief survey of specific disciplinary 
problems offers several interesting insights. It 
must be emphasized that while the death penalty 
was given to regular soldiers serving in Canada, 
there is no record of that sentence being given to 
any member of the militia, even though they were 
subject to it under the provincial Militia Acts and 
offences did occur specifically calling for it.18 The 
focus of this study lies with British and Canadian 
regular units and embodied and provincial units 
formed for the duration of the war and, to all 
intents and purposes, treated as regular troops 
and subject to the Articles of War.
 The Glengarry Light Infantry was raised 
in 1812 as a “regular” Canadian regiment in 
British service until it was disbanded in 1816. 
Left: Many commanding ofﬁcers found public embarrassment 
enhanced discipline better than corporal punishment. Here a 
Canadian soldier displays discomfort as he “rides the horse.”
Above: High illiteracy resulted in ofﬁcers routinely reading out the 
Articles of War to their personnel. As a result, ignorance of the law 
was not an acceptable defence. This image shows personnel from 
the Canadian Voltigeurs.
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The unit’s first inspection report for July 1812 
reported regular courts martial, with corporal 
punishments commuted to solitary confinement 
in jail. 
 During the war, at least 22 Glengarries were 
charged with desertion. Three were sentenced 
to death and their sentences were remitted to 
transportation or return to regimental duty. 
Private John Mitchell was sentenced to death, 
but his sentence was commuted, in recognition of 
his distinguished service at Fort George in 1813. 
Six other Glengarries were transported to New 
South Wales.19
 Private Davis deserted late in 1814, returned 
to the regiment in January 1815 and was 
sentenced to 300 lashes. Private Varnham 
received 105 of 250 lashes awarded for one 
crime, only to receive another 300 for desertion 
and theft. Varnham and Davis deserted again and 
both were sentenced to transportation for life.20
 Sergeant John McGinnis and Private John 
Peachy came to the attention of their commanding 
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Battersby, and the 
commander in Upper Canada, Major-General 
de Watteville, over a song they had composed, 
which Battersby claimed was disrespectful of 
the Glengarries. De Watteville did not agree, but 
concurred the pair should be court martialled. 
Peachy’s fate is not recorded, but McGinnis was 
reduced to private.21
 Courts martial continued well after the war 
ended and in the first six months of 1816, the 
Glengarry’s reported no less than 53 regimental 
courts-martial alone!22
 The Provincial Corps of Light Infantry 
or the Canadian Voltigeurs were known for 
their strict discipline. Their commander, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles-Michel de 
Salaberry, was stern, a characteristic 
gained from his service with the 60th 
Foot and from campaigning at Martinique and 
Walcheren.23 
 In 1812, the Voltigeurs experienced a mutiny 
due to false promises made by Captain Perrault 
while recruiting his company. Typical sentences 
included prison, heavy fines and hard labour. 
One deserter was forced to march through the 
ranks with a log attached to his feet. Absence 
without permission was punished by eight days 
of detention on bread and water. Detention could 
either be in the guardhouse or a brig at St. Jean. 
One voltigeur who insulted his officer, spent 18 
months in jail.24 
 Sometimes, disciplinary problems were dealt 
with in other ways. One soldier of the 104th 
thought he could negotiate the 80 or 90 miles of 
aboriginal forest of New Brunswick and reach the 
United States from Fredericton. He was close to 
death four days later when he was found by some 
natives who returned him to his barracks. Rather 
than lay charges, the colonel of the 104th waited 
until the man could walk again and brought him 
before the regiment. The colonel made a speech 
about the heinousness of desertion and then had 
the man march slowly between the ranks of the 
regiment, groaning most of the time, wearing the 
filthy overdress from his adventure over clean 
underclothes. Every part of the poor man’s body 
had been prayed upon by flies, bugs and insects. 
His face was a mass of inflamed sores, no eyes 
distinguishable. After that, there were no more 
desertions through the woods.25
 Disciplinary measures were not restricted to 
the rank and file. As the 1st, 8th, and 100th Foot 
Left: Many commanding ofﬁcers found public embarrassment 
enhanced discipline better than corporal punishment. Here a 
Canadian soldier displays discomfort as he “rides the horse.”
Above: High illiteracy resulted in ofﬁcers routinely reading out the 
Articles of War to their personnel. As a result, ignorance of the law 
was not an acceptable defence. This image shows personnel from 
the Canadian Voltigeurs.
Desertion was a serious crime resulting in 
service in a colonial corps or penal servitude.
Deserters who joined the enemy’s ranks 
faced execution. During the war 1,570 British 
regulars deserted units in Upper and Lower 
Canada, while approximately 5,000 soldiers 
deserted from the US Army. Here members of 
the Canadian Voltigeurs search for deserters.
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moved onto the field at Chippawa on 5 July 1814, 
Lieutenant Michael O’Flanagan of the 8th Foot 
lagged behind and then lay down on the ground 
before disappearing. He was court-martialled 
and cashiered.26 Another officer, Captain William 
Brereton, commanding a company in the 1st 
Foot, also fell behind, and his company went 
into action led by its senior subaltern. The court 
accepted Brereton’s appeal that he had fallen 
behind due to exhaustion. One can imagine the 
tension during the general courts martial, given 
the number of officer casualties suffered during 
the battle.27
 As a young country, the United States looked 
abroad for inspiration in creating its army. 
The American Articles of War were created 
in 1776 and revised in 1804 to make them 
compatible with the Constitution. Limits were 
placed on corporal punishment – a maximum 
of 50 instead of 100 lashes were permitted. 
Further reforms introduced for 1805 provided 
a statute of limitation of two years, forbad 
“concubinage,” playing at cards and dice and 
“frequent intoxication,” none of which were 
accepted by Congress. Passage of the new bill 
was delayed for two years when an argument over 
ordering soldiers to cut or crop their hair crossed 
into the realm of federal authority. The new 
Articles of War were finally passed in 1806.28 
 It is generally held that service in the United 
States Army was less harsh than that of Britain. 
The accepted narrative would suggest a more 
liberal approach towards discipline and in the 
case of corporal punishment this was true. 
However, during the War of 1812, federal service 
was unpopular, desertion rife and even though 
two blanket pardons were granted during the war, 
stiffer discipline was instituted which included 
beatings and other harsh treatment. At Regular 
Army posts, it was customary to have a brick or 
wood dungeon, “usually dark, unheated, damp 
and without adequate ventilation,” known as the 
“black hole.”29
 During 1814, Brigadier-General Winfield 
Scott oversaw what was likely the most rigorous 
collective training camps conducted by the US 
Army. Discipline was strict. Units in camp “were 
broken into a habit of subordination” and the only 
trouble came from, as Scott wrote, “worthless 
miscreants.”30
 The British did not flagrantly make use 
of the death penalty and considered corporal 
punishment as the last means of salvaging a poor 
soldier. Execution by firing party was reserved 
almost exclusively for deserting to the enemy, 
but could be awarded for mutiny and striking a 
sergeant or an officer. Hanging was for all capital 
offences except desertion to the enemy. During the 
Peninsular War, 78 British soldiers (52 British, 
the remainder foreigners), out of a maximum 
strength of approximately 60,000 total, were 
executed by firing squad. Another 40 caught in 
flagrante delicto committing crimes such as 
murder, theft or assault were hanged.31
 American practise was different. Flogging 
was suspended – not outlawed – in 1812, but 
the death penalty was used much more readily. 
In 1812, when the American Regular Army 
numbered 19,000 troops, four sentences of 
execution were issued, with three being reprieved. 
The next year, with the army at 23,000 men, there 
were 43 executions authorised and 11 reprieved. 
During 1814, when the army reached a height 
in strength of about 31,000, 160 sentences of 
execution were made and only 14 reprieved. 
Finally in 1815, 53 soldiers were sentenced for 
execution and 29 reprieved. Being executed for 
Five men were executed at La 
Prairie on 2 November 1813 for 
desertion. Execution was the 
rarest form of punishment in 
the British Army and generally 
awarded to repeat offenders 
or for desertion to the enemy 
in time of war. Here, the 
sentenced soldier kneels on 
his cofﬁn, while a chaplain 
reads a prayer, as the members 
of a regiment witness the 
proceedings.
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an infraction was more likely in the United States 
Army at the time, than in the British.32
 Discipline was not reserved only for junior 
officers or the rank and file. Courts-Martial also 
involved senior officers. Following his defeat 
at the Battle of the Thames in the fall of 1813, 
Major-General Henry Proctor faced five charges of 
carelessness and gross incompetence. The court 
marital sat in Montreal from December 1814 to 
January 1815 and consisted of an impressive 
board of 16 officers, four of whom were major-
generals. Included was Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles de Salaberry, of Châteuaguay fame. The 
board cleared Procter of the first charge, and 
found him guilty of the remainder. They found 
Procter had in many instances, been “erroneous 
in judgment,” and in several cases, deficient. 
Proctor was sentenced to suspension from rank 
and pay for six months and public reprimand. 
The Prince Regent remitted the suspension from 
rank and pay, but upheld the public reprimand, 
which was read out before every regiment in 
the army. The reprimand expressed the Prince 
Regents’ “high disapprobation” of Procter’s 
conduct and his 
regret that any officer of the length of service, 
and of the exalted rank which he has attained, 
should be so extremely wanting in professional 
knowledge, and so deficient in those active and 
energetic qualities, which must be required 
for every officer, but especially of one in the 
responsible situation in which the Major-General 
was placed.
While one might conclude that the British were 
looking for a scapegoat, the composition of the 
board would suggest Procter received a fair 
hearing from an intelligent and experienced group 
of officers, very much his peers.33
 The popular image of the British soldier 
is of a down-trodden figure, who had every 
advantage of service against him and facing brutal 
discipline. Hollywood and Wellington’s detractors 
have contributed to this, regularly reminding 
us of a remark made privately by the Duke in 
November 1831 of how the army was recruited 
– “ours is composed of the scum of the mere scum 
of the earth,” but they often forget to follow with 
“it is only remarkable that we should be able to 
make so much of them afterwards.”34 Discipline 
was harsh in the British Army, and, even more so 
in the United States Army. The level of discipline 
was the result of many factors, the character of 
the leaders being most important. Furthermore, 
as the Napoleonic Wars continued, the British 
Although ﬂogging had been suspended in the US Army 
as an inducement to recruiting, some ofﬁcers, such as 
Brigadier-General Winﬁeld Scott, devised punishments 
that were just as painful and used the death penalty more 
readily than their British counterparts. Major-General Henry Proctor, who held senior command in 
Upper Canada, was tried for incompetence and received a 
public reprimand that was read out before every regiment 
in the British Army.
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found they could not waste manpower by killing 
their soldiers or beating them to death, so found 
other means to maintain order. If an army from 
this period can be defined as a rabble waiting 
to be let loose, then perhaps this application of 
discipline was the most economical and in the 
end, the most just.
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